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Abstract 
Our paper sets up a simple model to assess, to the best of our knowledge for the first 
time, the relative pros and cons of housing downpayment and interest rate subsidies on 
the access to and the stability of the mortgage market. Our analysis unveils a number of 
relevant policy lessons for the design of housing subsidy programs, namely: (a) Under 
fiscal neutrality (same government outlay), both subsidies have the same positive effect 
on the ability and willingness to repay. But, for such neutrality to hold, the percentage 
interest rate subsidy must be larger than the downpayment subsidy, which is rare to 
happen in practice; (b) The interest rate subsidy raises the loan size a bank is willing to 
grant, but the downpayment subsidy does not, the reason being that the latter actually 
diminishes the need for bank financing for a given property value; (c) When targeting 
lower income households, the downpayment subsidy is superior to the interest rate 
subsidy, as the former increases the loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios, two key 
criteria for mortgage borrower eligibility. By the same token, the downpayment subsidy 
is more likely to have a stronger effect on low and medium value housing units; (d) 
Such progressivity comes at the cost of a higher probability of default, meaning that 
some trade-off between equity and financial stability may emerge; (e) Subsidies are 
likely to put upward pressure on housing prices. The downpayment subsidy has a 
direct effect (by injecting fiscal resources to cover part of the property price) and an 
indirect effect (by easing the access to the mortgage market); (f) The interest rate 
subsidy only has the latter effect; and (g) Compared to the interest rate subsidy, the 
downpayment support promotes a less aggressive competition in the real estate market. 
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Introduction 
 
Economic and social reasons justify the apparent concern of governments around the 
globe to support access to housing. In the Latin American context, two subsidy 
alternatives that have gained increasing momentum are the Chilean-style 
downpayment subsidy and the Colombian interest rate subsidy. Details on design, 
implementation and outcomes are provided in Alarcon, Demaestri and Piedrabuena 
(2013) and Bebczuk and Demaestri (2014). 
As with any subsidy, the flip side is the potentially deleterious impact on the fiscal 
budget and on the allocation and quality of bank loan portfolios. Disappointingly, 
despite these latent vulnerabilities, there exists a conspicuous lack of analytical work in 
this area. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, no research whatsoever has 
tackled the relative pros and cons of both types of subsidy from a fiscal, banking and 
real estate market perspective. Such analysis should be of utmost interest for countries 
running or planning on putting in place a housing subsidy program. 
To fill this void, this article presents a model of banking intermediation centered around 
subsidized mortgage loans.1 Despite its simplicity, the model is well-suited to lay out 
the main features and explore the fiscal and financial implications of downpayment and 
interest rate subsidies.   
The paper has three sections, devoted to setting up the model foundations (Section 1) 
and to exploring the impact on mortgage loan size and risk (Section 2) and on home 
prices (Section 3). Some conclusions and policy lessons close.  
  
                                                             
1 As customary in the banking literature, the model will rely on financial frictions stemming from 
asymmetric information (see Bebczuk, 2003).  
1. Model Setup 
In what follows we spell out the details of the model, which just intends to be a stylized 
representation about the behavior of banks and borrowers in the presence of mortgage 
subsidies. Loan contracts take place in two periods, one in which the bank selects the 
borrower and disburses the funds, and a second and final in which the loan is due and 
is either repaid or defaulted. There are two possible states of nature: in the successful 
scenario, with probability αs, the borrower obtains an income high enough to repay, 
while in the case of failure, occurring with probability αf, the borrower’s income is 
assumed to be nil.  Three equations are the backbone of the model, namely, the bank’s 
participation constraint (henceforth, BPC), the borrower’s ability to repay condition 
(BARC) and the borrower’s willingness to repay condition (BWRC).  
The BPC displays the break-even point beyond which the bank decides to stop lending,  
that is, ceases to willingly participate in the contract:  
 
(1 +  )    +   ≤   [1 + (1 −   )  ]  +       +   (   −  )              (1) 
 
According to equation (1), the bank aims to achieve an expected income greater or equal 
to the expenses involved in the intermediation process. The left-hand side highlights 
two costs: the cost of loanable funds –equal to the volume of deposits (Dep) times the 
gross required return on such deposits (1+r)- and other lending-related expenses, 
labeled as g. The right-hand side, in turn, describes the expected income sources. In the 
good scenario, the bank gets principal and interest in full, whereas in the negative 
scenario, the bank recovers part of the money owed, by liquidating the property in 
period 1 at an expected market value V1 net of mortgage foreclosure expenses E 
(covering legal and administrative outlays and the opportunity costs for judicial 
delays).   
Expected loan-related revenues comprise the payment made directly by the borrower as 
well as the interest rate subsidy, equal to the total interest payment due (the loan P 
times the loan interest rate rp). A few assumptions are implicit in the analysis: (i) While 
there is a borrower risk, the subsidy is paid to the bank with certainty; (ii) To avoid the 
trivial case of a risk-free loan, the net revenue from repossession is lower than the total 
outstanding debt, which means in turn that the loan interest rate will always be above 
the deposit interest rate; (iii) The bank is risk neutral, which means that expected values 
are taken as certain. Perfect competition will happen when equation (1) becomes an 
equality; and (iv) No other costs or revenues enter the bank’s income statement. Though 
some of these assumptions are more realistic than others, none of them is critical for our 
conclusions and are adopted only for the purpose of simplifying the presentation. 
The value of the property being purchased in the first period, V0, is linked to the loan 
value P by the following equation: 
 
  =    (1 −    −    )                                       (2) 
 
donde ds and dns  are, respectively, the subsidized and non-subsidized fractions of total 
downpayment in terms of V0. The expression (1 - ds - dns), o P/ V0, represents the initial 
loan-to-value,  or LTV.  
For equation (1) to be fulfilled, two conditions must be met as well. For one, the 
borrower must receive in the good state an income high enough that, in conjunction to 
the government subsidy, covers the amount due. Thus, borrowers will be able to repay 
when:  
 
    +       ≥  1 +                                         (3) 
 
The coefficient θ is the maximum percentage of period 1’s income allowed by regulation 
or the own bank’s policy to be applied to loan repayment.  The third and last condition 
is that, provided he/she is able, the borrower is willing to repay. For this incentive 
compatibility constraint to be satisfied, it is required that the cost of declaring default 
(the loss of the house with value V1 in period 1) be higher than or equal to the benefit of 
repudiating the debt (economizing on principal and interest): 
 
   ≥ [1 + (1 −   )  ]  −       −                   (4) 
 
Two additional factors may help defuse this moral hazard behavior. First, the decision 
hinges on the borrower’s initial self-financed investment sunk in the property in the 
form of downpayment (V0 × dns), as this sum will be lost for good upon the default 
event.  Secondly, there might be a cost C associated to default, manifesting itself in a 
credit downgrade, the costs of relocation, and the psychological stress from failing to 
meet the moral obligation towards the creditor. It is worth noting that the 
downpayment subsidy (V0 × ds), despite improving the ability to repay, does nothing in 
relation to the willingness to repay, as it is not borrower’s money at stake. 
  
2. The Impact of Subsidies on Loan Size and Risk 
This section will examine how these two subsidies affect the maximum loan size a 
borrower can take on and the default risk for these subsidized mortgages. Before 
proceeding, it is useful to solve for the loan interest rate rp in the bank’s participation 
constraint (BPC, equation (1’)), the borrower’s ability to repay condition (BARC, 
equation (3’)) and the borrower’s willingness to repay condition (BWRC, equation (4’)): 
 
   ≥
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                (1 ) 
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                                                        (3 ) 
 
   ≤
   +       +   −  
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In the plane (P, rp), the BPC function displays a non-linear, positive slope, as for a larger 
loan balance and a given net liquidation value (V1-E), the loan interest rate must rise so 
as to reach in expected value the minimum depositors’ required return (r). For the 
BARC function the relationship is negative because, for a given borrower’s income, a 
larger loan must be offset with a lower interest rate in order to maintain the ability to 
repay. Similar consideration explains the negative slope of the BWRC function: for a 
given V1, the incentive to default on the debt would increase unless the interest rate 
falls.  
Graphs 1-4 below depict the above functions under four possible configurations. A 
mortgage contract will be written as long as the three conditions are simultaneously 
met, a situation that will take place whenever rp lies on or above the BPC function and 
on or below the BARC and the BWRC functions. In Graph 1, no loan is made since no 
interest rate jointly satisfies the above conditions. The opposite is observed in Graph 2, 
where there is no maximum loan amount. These two cases are of course trivial and 
irrelevant in light of the questions at hand.  
Of greater interest is the case presented in Graph 3, where the ability to repay becomes 
a binding constraint and defines an upper loan limit, denoted as Pmax, barc. From equating 
(1’) and (3’), after some algebra we obtain:  
 
    ,     =  
1 −   
1 +  (1 −   )
   −   +   (   −  ) +     +
  
(1 −   )
                                          (5) 
 
The willingness to repay is the binding constraint in Graph 4, with the following 
equation defining the maximum loan size:  
 
    ,     =
1
1 +  
 −   +   (   −  ) + (   +       +  )
[   +   (1 −   )]
(1 −   )
                        (6) 
 
As expected, in both equations (5) and (6) the maximum loan size grows with V1 and 
diminishes with g and E. Y1 exerts a positive impact in equation (5), as does C and dns in 
equation (6).  
More importantly, the interest rate subsidy si, by improving both the ability and the 
willingness to repay, favors a higher loan level. Conversely, the downpayment subsidy 
at rate ds has no incidence on the amount lent. This may look odd in view of the 
facilitating role a subsidy is supposed to play, but it must be recalled that this sort of 
subsidy, rather than operating through the banking system, embodies a transfer to the 
house seller.  In fact, a larger subsidy implies, via equation (2), a smaller loan for a given 
V0 –or, alternatively, a larger V0 for a given P.  This point can be made even clearer by 
looking at the extreme case in which si=ds=100%. If si=100%, the borrower is responsible 
for repaying only the principal, while the interest is covered (with probability 1) by the 
government, all of this induces the bank to offer a larger loan. On the other hand, if 
ds=100%, then there would be no loan at all, as the borrower can now manage without 
bank financing. 
Naturally, the very same argument also explains the absence of ds in equations (5) and 
(6). The parameter dns appears in equation (6) solely through its effect as a commitment 
device on the willingness to repay. One possible pitfall of the downpayment subsidy 
would then be the strategic substitution between ds and dns: if opportunistic households 
with capacity to save and make a downpayment hide these funds to take full advantage 
of the subsidy, their incentive to repay will weaken. Proper ex ante screening is needed 
to discourage such behavior. 
Going back to the positive effect of the interest rate subsidy on loan size, this may be 
read as good or not-so-good news depending on the circumstances. For house buyers 
without capacity to pledge downpayment, a bigger loan can certainly be a solution. 
However, higher indebtedness turns borrowers more vulnerable to negative shocks and 
thus a default scenario, a risk that intensifies during economic downturns. Along 
similar lines, since any feasible solution will lie along the positively-slopping BPC 
function, larger loans are accompanied by a higher interest rate, which heightens the 
above-mentioned risk. 
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Graph 3 
  
In spite of this differential effect on loan size, the model underscores the fact that both 
subsidies promote a higher financial inclusion by turning eligible for a loan some 
applicants that would have been otherwise rejected, should they depend exclusively on 
their own resources. To see this point, let us insert equation (2) into equations (3) and (4) 
to get:  
   ≥
 
 
  1 +     −        (1 −    −    )                             (7) 
 
   ≥ [1 + (1 −   )  ]  (1 −    −    ) −       −             (8) 
 
All else equal, higher values of si  and ds go hand-in-hand with an enhanced ability and 
willingness to repay. Equations (7) and (8) reinforce the claim that the downpayment 
subsidy fosters mortgage penetration by reducing, for a given V0, the loan amount and 
thus the prospective debt burden for the borrower. From the bank’s participation 
constraint (equation (1)), this is also associated to a lower mortgage interest rate. 
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Graph 4 
To perform a more strict comparison between subsidies, it is sensible to assume fiscal 
neutrality, that is, that the total outlays are the same under either scheme. In present 
value, the fiscal cost for the downpayment subsidy [FC (ds)] and for the interest rate 
subsidy [FC (si)] equal: 
 
FC (ds) = ds × V0                                                                                            (9) 
FC (si) = (si × rp × P)/(1+r) = [si × rp × (1- ds – dns)  × V0]/(1+r)                 (10) 
 
Equating both expressions, we obtain the interest rate equivalent subsidy (si,eq) with the 
same fiscal cost in present value as a given downpayment subsidy: 
 
  ,    =
   (1 +  )
(1 −    −    )  
                                                                                       (11) 
 
For the same percentage subsidy (ds= si), the downpayment subsidy is more expensive 
from a budgetary standpoint. For example, if rp = 15%, dns = 0% and ds = 10%, assuming 
r=0, then si,eq = 74%. Intuitively, this follows from the fact that the downpayment 
subsidy finances the principal, which usually exceeds the interest component, even 
more so in a two-period model such as the present one. 
A key lesson here is that, under fiscal neutrality, the choice of one subsidy regime or the 
other is immaterial in regard to the ability to repay, as for construction both subsidies 
will strengthen it to the same extent, in one case by liberating the borrower from part of 
the interest payments and in the other by cutting down the required indebtedness –see 
equation (7). The same goes, as apparent from equation (8), for the willingness to repay, 
provided the borrower puts up the same downpayment of his/her own (dns ×V0). 2   
More profound differences can be pinpointed, though, in terms of focalization once we 
introduce certain typical eligibility requirements imposed by banks and regulators, as 
well as some usual design features of mortgage subsidy programs. In turn, such 
                                                             
2 The subsidy type is also inconsequential as to the bank capital requirements, since the risk weight for 
mortgage loans under the Basel guidelines is 35% regardless of the loan-to-value ratio. 
differences are likely to affect the average quality of the mortgage loan portfolio, as 
shown next. 
The first feature to factor in is that banks make credit decisions not only based on 
expectations of future variables but primarily on observable variables that are thought 
to be good predictors of payment behavior. Two crucial indicators in this regard are the 
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and the debt-to-income (DTI) ratio, which are formalized in 
equations (12) and (13):3      
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= (1 −    −    ) ≤                             (12) 
              
    =
 
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=
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=
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(1 −    −    ) ≤                          (13)   
 
As shown in the equations, by regulation or their internal credit policies, banks set 
maximum cutoff values for both parameters,          and         .  
For its part, housing programs, in line with their social and redistributive goals, tend to 
adopt eligibility rules biased towards pro-poor and middle income families. Popular 
clauses are that beneficiaries must not have an income above a stated limit (equation 
(14)) and that the percentage subsidy must decrease with the property value (equation 
(15) and (16)): 
 
   ≤                                   (14)    
 
   =  (  )                                    (15)     
                           
   =  (  )                                 (16)   
                           
with z(.) and y(.) ranging between [0, 1] and z’<0 and y’<0. 
                                                             
3 Notice that formulae include the observable variables V0 and Y0, not the future values V1 and Y1.  
Now a major difference arises between both subsidies, as the downpayment subsidy 
diminishes both the LTV and DTI ratios (see equations (12) and (13)), but the interest 
rate subsidy affects neither of them. This is so because the latter alleviates the financial 
burden once the loan has been granted while the former shrinks in advance both ratios 
by reducing the need for debt at the time of applying for the loan.  
Since lower income family have a limited capacity to save and hence accumulate 
enough wealth to provide the downpayment by themselves, the downpayment subsidy 
is especially critical for this population segment. By capping the income level to be 
admitted to the program (equation (14)) and setting a subsidy decreasing in property 
value (equations (15) and (16)), these subsidies reinforce their progressive effect. Still, 
the interest rate subsidy may fall short of reaching out to some poorer families unable to 
make the downpayment, so the government support may not be sufficient for these 
borrowers to qualify in the eyes of the bank.  
Targeting low and middle income customers is likely to have some impact on the 
quality of the mortgage loan portfolio. This clientele has a priori a higher probability of 
default –the parameter αf in equation (1)-, owing to their higher risk of unemployment 
(especially among less skilled and informal workers) and, in the case of small 
entrepreneurs, their limited capital and product diversification, which turn them 
particularly vulnerable to negative shocks. Compounding this problem, a lower 
probability of success implies a higher interest rate (via equation (1)), leading to a 
heavier future financial burden that compromises even further, as a second round 
effect, the ability and willingness to repay. As evident from this discussion, a trade-off 
between loan delinquency and income distribution equity may ensue.  
 
 
  
3. Housing Subsidies and Home Prices 
In assisting households to buy a house, subsidy schemes may fuel the demand and thus 
inflate the market price for residential real estate. By how much prices change depends 
on several factors: (a) The volume of additional demand made possible by the program; 
(b) The characteristics and location of the houses in higher demand; (c) The supply 
response in the face of such new demand; and (d) The influence of the program on 
price-setting behavior and competition in the real estate market. 
In regard to the first factor, although both subsidies create additional demand, only the 
downpayment subsidy does that directly, by providing the household with fresh 
money to complete the transaction. The interest rate subsidy helps the household in a 
more indirect fashion, by making it more likely to successfully apply for a loan. That 
being said, it should be kept in mind that the flow of new demand infused into the 
market is normally is well above total subsidy outlays.4 As reflected in equation (9) for 
the downpayment subsidy, the government takes upon itself just a fraction ds of total 
house value V0, with the remaining part being covered by the buyer and the creditor.5  
As for the second factor on the list, it is important to recall that the additional demand 
will not spread uniformly across all available units in the market, but it will rather 
concentrate on those segments that are targeted by the program. Building on previous 
discussion in the paper, governments seek to support lower income families, which as a 
rule tend to look for equally lower value housing located in less expensive 
neighborhoods, and this is the market most likely to experience price inflation. Since 
this targeting is clearer under a downpayment vis-à-vis an interest rate subsidy, this 
effect will be more pronounced in the first case.  
An obvious argument to be considered, and one largely independent of the subsidy 
design to be adopted, is the responsiveness of supply to a larger demand. In general, 
this reaction will be stronger in the long- than in the short-term, and will as well depend 
on other variables, including the availability of land and financing for construction 
projects, the building regulations at the municipal level, and the perception within the 
construction industry about the government commitment toward the subsidy program 
as a long-term policy or a temporary fix. 
                                                             
4 On the other hand, subsidy expenses may overestimate the net effect of the subsidy whenever some 
beneficiaries that were planning on purchasing the house without government assistance now enroll in 
the program. The pure effect consists of the houses being bought only by virtue of the subsidy. 
5 Also those equations are written for one representative loan, not for the whole number of subsidies 
provided, which is the relevant figure to measure total additional demand. 
The subsidy scheme may not be innocuous either for the degree of competition in the 
real estate market. In particular, the buyer pays the full price under an interest rate 
subsidy but only a share of it under a downpayment subsidy.6 This may lead the 
household to overpay for a given property, as a result of a less active search or less 
aggressive price negotiation, or to look for a unit for a more expensive than without the 
subsidy. This distortion will amplify with the generosity of the subsidy (i.e., higher ds).  
To close, it must be noted that not only subsidies affect housing prices, but 
developments in the latter may have some influence on the program outcomes. For one, 
sustained housing price inflation will create a negative externality on households 
entering the market in the future by making units less affordable for subsidy 
beneficiaries and even more so for non-beneficiaries. Secondly, on a more positive note, 
higher housing prices in the future strengthen the willingness to repay, by making the 
default strategy more costly, as clear from the role of V1 in equation (8). 
 
  
                                                             
6 As a matter of fact, a lower price will benefit the buyer also under an interest rate subsidy by 
diminishing future interest and principal payments, and with fiscal neutrality both subsidies should be 
equivalent on this front as well. However, unlike the interest rate subsidy, the downpayment subsidy 
may be viewed by an upfront discount by some myopic households.  
Conclusions and Policy Lessons 
This work has investigated, to our best knowledge for the best time, the relative merits 
and pitfalls of downpayment and interest rate subsidies on the access to and the 
stability of the mortgage market, as well as their repercussions on the functioning of the 
real estate market. 
The main conclusions from the analysis are: 
(a) By improving the ability and willingness to repay, both subsidies enhance the 
probability of being eligible for a mortgage; 
(b) Under fiscal neutrality, both subsidies have the same effect on the ability and 
willingness to repay; 
(c) In practice, for fiscal neutrality to hold, it would be necessary the percentage interest 
rate subsidy to be much larger than the downpayment subsidy, which is rare to 
happen; 
(d) When it comes to the willingness to repay, the interest rate subsidy may  however be 
superior in the case that the latter might induce opportunistic borrowers to 
substitute downpayment of their own for subsidized downpayment; 
(e) The interest rate subsidy raises the loan size a bank is willing to grant, but the 
downpayment subsidy does not, the reason being that the latter actually diminishes 
the need for bank financing for a given property value; 
(f) The higher loan size under an interest rate subsidy may help borrowers gain access 
to a larger value property, but at the same time gives rise to higher default risk, as 
the rising leverage and interest rate make borrowers more vulnerable to negative 
shocks; 
(g) When targeting lower income households, the downpayment subsidy is superior to 
the interest rate subsidy, as the former increases the loan-to-value and debt-to-
income ratios, two key criteria for mortgage borrower eligibility; 
(h) Such progressivity comes at the cost of a higher probability of default, meaning that 
some trade-off between equity and financial stability may emerge; 
(i) Subsidies are likely to put upward pressure on housing prices. The downpayment 
subsidy has a direct effect (by injecting fiscal resources to cover part of the property 
price) and an indirect effect (by easing the access to the mortgage market). The 
interest rate subsidy only has the latter effect; 
(j)  The downpayment subsidy is more likely to have a stronger effect on low and 
medium value housing units; 
(k) Compared to the interest rate subsidy, the downpayment support promotes a less 
aggressive competition in the real estate market; and 
(l) Regardless of the subsidy type, housing price inflation will also be driven by the 
supply reaction and other factors. In turn, housing revaluation over time may have 
one positive side effect (enhanced willingness to repay) and a negative side effect 
(externality on future buyers, both within and outside the subsidy program). 
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